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 Recently, many research studies have suggested the integration of safety 
engineering at an early stage of modeling and system development using 
Model-Driven Architecture (MDA). This concept consists in deploying the 
UML (Unified Modeling Language) standard as aprincipal metamodel for the 
abstractions of different systems. To our knowledge, most of this work has 
focused on integrating security requirements after the implementation phase 
without taking them into account when designing systems. In this work, we 
focused our efforts on non-functional aspects such as the business logic 
layer, data flow monitoring, and high-quality service delivery. Practically, we 
have proposed a new UML profile for security integration and code 
generation for the Java platform. Therefore, the security properties will be 
described by a UML profile and the OCL language to verify the requirements 
of confidentiality, authorization, availability, data integrity, and data 
encryption. Finally, the source code such as the application security 
configuration, the method signatures and their bodies, the persistent entities 
and the security controllers generated from sequence diagram of system’s 
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In the resent years, we witnessed a fast technological evolution accompanied with a massive use of 
IT services that automated and facilitated many things in our daily lives. A tremendous amount of software 
applications and systems are built every day around the world to cover the evolving customers’ needs. 
Consequently, existing applications should be updated and enhanced constantly. For this reason, Model-
Driven Architecture (MDA) has been developed to provide an innovative development process based on 
models.MDA is an initiative proposed by Object Management Group (OMG) to pick up the standard UML, 
which is deployed for modeling Object-Oriented Systems’ design. MDA tries to cover up the full software 
development life cycle starting from the inception phase until the maintenance or transition phase. In 
addition, MDA is a modeling language based principally on the sorting out of preoccupations in the form of 
abstraction levels where everyone represents a different system’s view.  
The separation of the system models can facilitate the improvement of the non-functional aspects 
with supplementary security information to make it more complete. Therefore, MDA approach promotes the 
massive exploit of model through the whole software development process pleading from a Computation 
Independent Model (CIM) dedicated for requirements specifications to code model or components transient 
by the Platform Independent Model (PIM) and Platform Specific Model (PSM). Code generation is 
performed by applying different kinds of translations or transformations: CIM to PIM, PIM to PSM, and 
PSM to source code.  
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This paper provides a new model-driven methodology, based on MDA, allowing the generation of 
secure software applications with functional and non-functional aspects after modeling them in the analysis 
and design phase. The implementation phase will be performed using Sequence Diagrams of the 
System’sInternal Behavior (SDSIB), which is used for modeling the system’s internal behavior for each 
system’s use case. In this approach, SDSIB will be deployed as PIM generated from CIM. 
This approach improves the productivity of designers and developers, and the quality of service by 
allowing them to decrease the design’s mistakes and deal with consecutive improvements, which are 
produced during the implementation phase. The application’s internal behaviors are modeled through the 
sequence diagram of system’s internal behavior that extends the system's functionalities. The internal 
behavior is developed together with its meta-model to illustrate the full transactions between objects during 
the execution of the use case. Each use case will be extended with the security policies that are already 
defined by the security experts at the specification phase. 
The presented paper aims to carry on our earlier works by providing a Template-Oriented Code 
Generator that allows the generation of secure software applications through the new approach that extends 
the Java meta-model and sequence diagram meta-model to introduce the security concepts into the modeling 
and implementation phase. In this paper, we have chosen SDSIB as PIM because we found that this category 
of behavioral diagrams is better than behavioral diagrams due to its composition and offered services.  
By applying a set of model-to-model transformations, we can generate automatically secure object-
oriented software applications including the system’s security infrastructure, methods and their bodies, 
persistence beans, configurations files, synchronization rules, business logic controllers, Data Access 
Objects, and security controllers. To do that, our generator uses, as input, an intermediate model, this is 
obtained directly from SDSIB after applying a set of model transitions. Such model aims to get better 
readability, scalability, reliability, and reusability of systems before and after the implementation phase. 
Additionally, such intermediate model is used to make bigger the target platform with non-functional 
improvements or Cross-cutting concerns, such as security policies properties, synchronization rules, 
persistence, or QOS constraints. In this work, we have tried to come together between functional aspect and 
non-functional aspect to consider the non-functional properties during the analysis, design, and the 
implementation phase. 
 For each use case, we affect the security profile to enhance the system’s use cases with the 
indispensable permissions, such as confidentiality rules, traceability constraints, and non-repudiation rules, 
then each use case will be converted to SDSIB to determine different objects and sub-operations participants 
in the execution of the use case by following the new meaning of the Larman’s Operation Contracts (LOC).  
To generate secure object-oriented software applications, we have focused on scalability, 
maintainability, and safety of the system. We used Model View Controller (MVC) design patterns altogether 
with Grasp Patterns basing on SDSIB elaboration to feed the generator with the new-fangled structure of 
systems, which are three mains layers: views, controllers, and models. In this work, the controller layer will 
be subdivided into two controllers: Processing Controller (PC) and security controller (security validator) that 
will be obtained automatically through the proposed methodology. 
SDSIB is gathered from Sequence Diagram of System’s External Behavior (SDSEB) that represents 
only the actors’ events and the system’s responses. To protect each action or message initiated by the actor, 
we should apply the security properties verification before (precondition), during, and after (postcondition) 
the system’s objects interactions, and before the data storage in the database by applying the novel tool so-
called Extension Post- Pre Condition Larman (EPPL). 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes related works. We give an Overview of 
the software development process and security engineering in Section 3. We show the proposed approach in 
Section 4. In Section 5 we talk about the sequence diagram of system’s internal behavior. Results and 
discussionis given in section 6. We conclude our paper in Section 7. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORKS 
In this section, we will highlight the critical review of previous works that integrate monitoring 
strategies and security aspects into the software development process. specifically, the most important works 
that use MDA as a methodology to integrate non-functional aspects into the software development process. 
In recent years, significant progress has been made in developing security techniques to address 
growing security concerns and performance. Among the most successful and best-known contributions in the 
world, we highlight work that is interested in the core work of Model Driven Security (MDS) to integrate 
security considerations into the software development process. First, David Basin and al. Basin Det. al. 
Introduce Model Driven Security (MDS) for the first time to design secure software [1]. To apply this 
methodology, the same authors proposed a solution to obtain the generation of access control policies from 
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abstract authorization rules that are written in the form of constraints. In addition, the proposed approach is 
more interesting and flexible at the same time. 
InLodderstedtet. al.a domain-specific language (DSL) called SecureUML was deployed to take into 
account the security vulnerabilities and risks of the given technology in the development process[2]. This 
DSL is used to model access control policies through a new vocabulary to annotate UML models with the 
information needed for access control. However, this work remains very far from a generic methodology that 
supports all security properties and provides mechanisms for assessing sustainability. 
With respect to security in service-oriented architectures, security objectives have been represented 
with graphical notations in business process models in order to transform security requirements into concrete 
security policies as outlined in [3]. Practically, the authors of this study have put forward a specific model 
called Security Policy Model (SPM), which is used to help implement security requirements such as 
authentication and access control. This work has not built specific tools to generate the final code 
corresponding to the security objectives and has no concrete formalism to describe the security needs 
throughout the software development process. 
Satoh F et. al.Introduce a solution allowing annotating system's models with security rules about 
authentication[4]. In this work, authentication security policies generated by applying WS-Security Policy 
standard and Security Infrastructure Model (SIM) as a code template. this last one contains all security rules 
for the target platform; code template was deployed to map the business models with the security objectives. 
Additionally, an executable corresponding to security policies generated by applying this code template. 
SatohF, Yamaguchi Ypropose an approach for generating the security configuration for IBM WAS[5]. 
This approach aims to affect the mapping between IBM WAS Deployment Descriptor (DD) and WS-Security 
Policy through a specific model deployed, which is used to ensure the necessary mapping between business 
models and security rules models; these models allowing transforming security policies to various security 
configurations such as IBM WA configuration. However, Juerjens and al. [6] propose a new approach so-
called UMLsec as a solution to integrate the security aspects during the software development phases through 
the proposed guide in this work that help developers which are not expert in term of security to take into 
account the security risks and vulnerabilities in the system development stages. From a practical perspective, 
the proposed approach limited since it only resulted in the security specification modeling for a few 
properties without providing a methodology adopted and accompanied by a specific tool for code generation 
including the security rules according to chosen platform. 
Next, a new framework so-called SECTET has been proposed by [7] for monitoring the security' 
engineering in parallel with the software engineering.This framework extended by a specific language called 
SECTET-LP for defining security policies in the software functionalities. Consequently, the abstract access 
control policies transformed to XACML code through XACML standard. From a comparative point of view, 
this approach confined to security exigencies declaration for a few properties without providing a concrete 
formalism to introduce the access control policies during systems development process. Also, no tool made 
in parallel for automating code generation for both aspects functional and non-functional. 
Regarding component-based application security, [8] grant responsibility and permissions for the 
security expert to set up the high-level security policies. This work proposed a specific middleware called 
SecureMiddlware to extend CORBA component models with different necessary non-functional properties as 
the security or reconfiguration. In addition, security exigencies specified over the Policy Definition Language 
(PDL) and transformed immediately by an openPMF Policy Management Framework. However, this 
methodology does not support a specific tool for security configuration generation and does not guarantee the 
sustainability assessment. From a practical point of view, this approach stays immature to apply it to others 
technologies such as could computing, Multi-agent systems, and machine learning. 
In spite of this, there no generic methodology for security integration and code generation from 
PSM, including genericity, re-utilization, and sustainability assessment. Regarding code generation, we cited 
approaches based on Petri-Nets [9] for automating code generation for functional concerns. However, this 
standard does not cover the modeling of the security aspect of system’s modeling and does not follow 
technological advances in term of security. Therefore, Petri-Nets cannot be a generic standard addressing 
security integration during all software development process, including analysis, design, and implementation.   
To the best of knowledge, the most important methodologies given in this topic has not enriched 
with a specific code generator for automating code generation by deploying the existing tools to convert 
system’s functionalities to the source code. For example, Roubi Set. al. present a model-driven approach to 
generate GUI for Rich Application Internet by exploiting the using Eclipse Modeling Framework for Meta-
Modeling, Query View Transformation for model transformations, and Acceleo for code generation [10]. 
However, this work does not address the code generation for both aspects functional and non-functional. Due 
to massive use of web services in different heterogeneous platforms, [11] propose a security interactive 
model of web service based on WebSphere and .NET to realize security interaction of heterogeneous 
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platforms. This model adopts a new approach based on predicate logic to integrate the security policies of 
heterogeneous platforms and uses the integrated policy to sign the SOAP message. Consequently, the 
proposed method is specific for web services and can not be applied to others technologies. 
As far as cloud implementation is concerned, technological advances in security also target cloud 
computing or cloud architecture to secure and secure the cloud platform. To this end, much work has been 
done in this direction, but we are discussing only the most important contributions such as [12], which deal 
with security and safety in cloud implementation by providing guidance. users with cloud and mobile cloud 
expertise to help customers choose cloud implementation appropriately for security and safety constraints. 
However, this approach does not provide a method for describing the timing and integration phase of the 
security architecture, and does not provide a specific tool for generating cloud implementation from the cloud 
architecture. 
In this current work, we completed our previous works given on this topicby monitoring data flows 
during the exchanging of messages between software’s components firstly and increasing the number of 
security properties addressed. In this work, SDSIB was chosen as a PIM instead of communication diagram 
[13]-[17] with the aim to apply the new semantics of the security during the elaboration of the software 
operations in the goal to apply the new semantics of the security during the elaboration of the software 
operations.  
We have implemented our methodology to address service qualities, including the generalization of 
automation in all aspects, reduced application development costs, decreased maintenance costs, and 
sustainability assessment. The new syntax was obtainded from LOC In order to improve SDSIB with the way 
of exchanging messages between software components, this semantics feeds UML with precise semantics to 
facilitate code generation according to the chosen platform. 
This paper is underwritten in security engineering and model-driven engineering, which aims to 
cope with the increasing rise of the Internet of Things such as objects, components, agents or Web services. 
This MDA-based contribution and the UML profile that extends the intermediate model with security 
constraints; this type of model is used to allow platform scalability compared to other enhancements that can 




3. OVERVIEW OF THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND SECURITY 
ENGINEERING AUTOMATION 
In this section, we present an overview of the Larman’soperation contractsand the syntax of the 
security constraints. We show the SDSIB meta-model and the various improvements that have been made 
over the SDSIB to take into account the security semantics of security properties during flow interactions 
between software components. We describe the most important transformations performed to improve our 
intermediate model of the chosen platform with security constraints such as authentication rules, 
authorization rules, integrity rules, data encryption rules. 
 
3.1.  Overview of Larman’s Operation Contracts 
A Larman’s Operation Contracts (LOC)[18]describe the state of the system before and after 
receiving or calling on system components by system actors. From a semantic point of view, LOC describe 
how the components of the system cooperate with each other to respond to requests by determining the 
different objects involved in the execution of the data flow. This contract defines all collaborations to execute 
the requested use case. condition and post-condition. From a logical point of view, Graig Larman was 
interested in the internal behaviors of the system through the definition of the state of the system before and 
after the execution of the request in order to build the design of the system. In the pre-condition, LOC 
describes the initial system. state, while the post-condition describes the state of the system after completion 
of the query. 
Specifically, Graig focused on the state of the system by describing many things such as created 
objects, destroyed objects, formed and broken associations, and changes in the state of attributes after the 
execution of the query. In the pre-condition, GraigLarman was addressed to the system state before reaching 
the requested component. From a safety point of view, Graig does not describe the state of the system in 
terms of safety and sustainability assessment. Semantically, security rules are not retrieved before and after 
the completion of the target resource. The old LOC does not correctly and securely determine the main 
objects or components involved in executing requests from system actors. 
To do this, we proposed an extension of this contract to become versatile and cover security issues 
at the same time. Therefore, the semantics of security policies described by security experts will be 
considered in the new definition of LOC to semantically cover them in the state of the system before and 
after the execution of the process. Like that, we integrated the security properties during the software 
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development process. During the extension of LOC; we benefited from the benefits of the MDA approach to 
reduce design errors and vulnerabilities. 
Thanks to LOC's new semantics, we can safely draw and generate all the interactions between the 
system components involved in constructing the response. Practically, SDSIB has been dragged on the basis 
of the new LOC definition, and the Object Constraint Language (OCL) used to describe the constraints of 
security policies. SDSIB construction will be based on GRASP patterns to facilitate the assignment of 
responsibilities to participants involved in the execution of use cases. 
 
3.2.  Overview of Pre-Post Condition Extension 
In this section, we have extended the pre-post condition of LARMAN to introduce and validate the 
properties of security policies such as authorization, authentication, data integrity, data encryption and non-
repudiation when developing operating contracts. The main purpose of this extension is to inject the security 
constraints, during the change of state of the system, when an action is triggered by an actor. 
This new semantics of LOC allows designers to draw a secure SDSIB in which we designate all 
interactions between interacting objects to respond to incoming requests. These improvements reduce design 
errors and improve design quality. In other words, we guarantee that source and target objects interact 
securely and respect the security constraints defined in the UML profile. 
In this extension, we have incorporated the GRASP patterns after their extension to distribute the 
assignment of tasks on the system objects. It is used to initialize the prerequisites of the initial state of the 
system and to describe the state of the system after execution of the use case postconditions. We used OCL to 
enhance system functionality with security policies; precondition and postcondition. Conversely, the new 
semantics of LOC allows developers to securely conclude the various operations including source and target 
objects participating in each interaction. Via a specific code generator, we automatically generate system 
operations code along with their security policies. 
 
3.3.  Overview of Extended Precondition  
In the extended precondition, we introduced the security policies constraints verification to check 
system’s state in term of security such as authorization, authentication, and data integrity before continuing to 
achieve system' use cases. To produce secure software applications, it is recommended to describe the 
semantics of the security policies during the software’ architecture design to facilitate UML profile 
application on the intermediate model. Our methodology applied to the existing software development 
methodologies like UP-UX for extending them in the goal to consider both the functional and non-functional 
aspects at the same time during the system design. After being extending the SDSIB with the UML profile, 
we apply our proposed tool or code generator to generate the code from the system’s models. For this reason, 
the code generator should be able to interpret the new semantic of LOC and generate the corresponding code 
including system methods, methods bodies, class attributes, security infrastructure, security controller, and 
DAO. As a result, the non-functional aspects configurations will be decreased automatically according to the 
chosen platform by providing the functioning rules definition concerning the user permissions and data flow 
protection. 
By applying the new definition of LOC, designers and developers can benefit from numerous 
advantages which are: 
1. Reducing design errors. 
2. Reducing the system security. 
3. Improving the system’s qualities. 
4. Keeping a reverse-engineering during system design. 
5. Improve the designer’s knowledge in terms of security techniques. 
6. Verifying the security policies constraints related to system resources before using them. 
7. Improving the modeling quality. 
 
3.4.  Security Constraints Syntax 
In this section, we provide monitoring mechanisms to enhance the static and dynamic behavior of 
systems with the security constraints of authentication verification, authorization verification, data integrity 
verification, and encryption verification. critical data by applying the UML profile. improved with the 
necessary security constraints, which are described by OCL. Then, these constraints and any other 
enhancements will be applied on the SDSIB to assign security requirements and responsibilities to the objects 
involved in the execution of a system action. To take into account the code generation of the infrastructure of 
the system. security, with the security templates applied to the functional aspects when generating the code 
according to the chosen platform; the generated code will be a language understandable by the compilers. 
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By applying a set of model transformation, the proposed generator generates a built-in security 
controller (SC) to check the semantics of the security policies represented by the stereotypes during the 
software development process; the security policy infrastructure generated from the SDSIB in the form of 
XMI / XML. 
 
3.5.  Security Policies Constraints Syntax for Permission Monitoring 
To interact with software components, authorization monitoring is recommended to check the status 
of the logged-on user's identity based on the security policies involved in modeling the requested 
components. In our methodology, authentication and authorization security policies are strengthened to 
ensure the durability of unsupervised requests through security policy constraints. 
To do this, we proposed the syntax of the security constraint to reinforce user authentication and 
authorization via the OCL to restrict unauthorized access as shown below. 
 
Context Object_Name  
Inv: list_users->includes(connected_user) 
 
In addition, each class stereotyped with a secure stereotype, automatically a preliminary 
authentication is triggered before interacting with the requested resources. 
In this approach, we applied security checking on the content of system objects themselves such as 
methods, attributes, associations, resources, data flows between objects, and implemented interfaces to 
decrease system security. To do this, we have profiled the system objects, operations and attributes with the 
already improved UML profile with the security policy constraints proposed by the security experts. These 
constraints are assigned to the UML profile according to the following syntax, as shown below. 
 










In our UML profile, we have developed a specific meta-class (stereotype) to apply security policies 
on the attributes of system objects. For this, we have improved this stereotype with the security constraints of 
the policy as shown in the following syntax. As a result, this solution helps reduce security vulnerabilities 
and improves the quality of the generated systems. 
 
Context Object_Name 
Pre: self.attributes>forAll(attribute | attribute->NotEmpty)And  
Connected_User.role.permissions>includes(self.attributes.permission) 
And primitivesTypes->exists(self.attributes.type) 
And Coonected_User-> size () = self.attrinutes. multiplicity 
 
In this methodological support, we have proposed another meta-class to reinforce data encryption 
during interactions between software components. This meta-class enriches with the security policy 
constraints on data encryption as shown in the following syntaxes; the first applied to the attributes of the 
object and the second to the entities. As a result, the code generator enriched with a specific template 
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In order to validate these constraints, we applied the security profile after its extension to the 
security constraints on the SDSEB as shown in Figure 1. We implemented the proposed generator to generate 
the source code corresponding to the two functional and non-functional aspects by their templates described 





Figure 1. SDSEB profiled with Encrypted stereotype 
 
 
3.6.  Data Integrity Constraints 
Semantically, we have strengthened our methodology to approve the state of the object in terms of 
data integrity when developing prerequisites and post-conditions. We have developed specific stereotypes to 
promote software components with data integrity issues. These stereotypes apply to the intermediate model 
and its content, which is derived from PSM to increase software requirements with data integrity concerns. 
To facilitate the construction of data integrity constraints, we have suggested a syntax for checking the 
integrity of object data, as shown in the following syntax. The code generator enriched with a specific model 
dedicated to data integrity for the conversion of profiled models into source code. 
 
Context Object_Name 
Pre: self->NotEmpty  
Post: self.attributes.values-> 
forAll( value | attribute.value =attribute.value@pre) 
 
Therefore, we can affect security policy monitoring by applying the new LOC definition and more 
specifically during SDSIB development. We obtained SDSIB from the SDSEB by applying the new LOC to 
determine all the components involved in performing software actions and to support the security architecture 
at the same time by applying the UML profile. 
We have expanded the GRASP models to assign responsibilities and security policies to the 
software components. The new semantics of GRASP allow us to precisely define the system resources 
needed to complete the business processes of the system by recognizing the constraints of low coupling and 
strong cohesion. 
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3.7.  Grasp Patterns Concept  
Craig Larman has created Grasp patterns to solve modeling errors. The purpose of grasp patterns is 
to provide a mechanism for assigning responsibilities to solicited system objects to execute system processes. 
In fact, there are nine input models that are: low coupling, high cohesion, designer, expert, controller, pure 
manufacturing, polymorphism, information expert and protected variations. In our methodology, we have 
extended them to take account of the samanticsand constraints of security policies when assigning 
responsibilities by improving the low coupling and high cohesion. In addition, we have added another pattern 
to the existing patterns, which is the security controller deployed to monitor infrastructure security according 
to the chosen platform and put in place considerations of low coupling and high cohesion; this controller is 
positioned at the front to intercept the status of queries coming from outside. In Table 1, we show the new 
semantics of some models. 
 
 
Table 1. Grasp patterns and their new semantic 
Grasp pattern Description New semantic 
Low coupling Minimize the links  between system's components 
to facilitate their scalability, readability, reliability, 
and reusability. 
 
Reinforce the system’s components to 
verify the security policies proposed 
through the UML profile before 
establishing a new link between system’s 
objects. 
High cohesion Reinforce the system’s objects to realize the 
actions belong to its responsibilities.  
Improve the system’s objects 
responsibilities with the security policies 
conditions illustrated by the UML profile; 
these constraints checked out through the 
design pattern:  security controller. 
Security Controller Dedicated to separate between the system’s layers 
and facilitate the system’s scalability. 
 
We have proposed a new design pattern 
sacrificed for monitoring the non-
functional properties to improve the low 
coupling and high cohesion 
 
 
By applying the new semantic of grasp patterns, we can introduce and verify the security policies 
constraints during the assignment of responsibilities to the objects involved in achieving the system’s actions. 
Designers enrich system’s functionalities with the security policies exigencies by applying the new definition 
of grasp and the security profile.  
 
3.8.  Overviewof Extended Postcondition 
In this work, we extended the LOC postcondition to consider the validation of security policies 
described in the prerequisite. Systematically, the postcondition defines the basic state of the system after 
execution of the system use cases. This extension allows domain experts to improve the functionality of the 
system with the semantics of security policies and more specifically the creation of objects, the destruction of 
objects, the formatting of associations, the destruction of associations and the change of state after the 
execution of the request. Therefore, domain’s experts use our UML profile to improve the SDSIB with the 




4. PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this contribution, we present a new approach for modeling the software architecture and 
integrating the most important security considerations into system design. Our intention is to overwhelm 
security vulnerabilities and increase the scalability of security. We used our methodology for the UP-XP 
approach to overcome non-functional features throughout the software development process. We encouraged 
this approach with a particular code generator to produce the final code from profiled models. As a result, 
software developers accurately produce the internal behavior of the system and act on the low coupling and 
high cohesion to provide readable systems as shown in Figure 2. 
To do this, we used MDA as a modeling language that supports the extended use of models through 
model transformation. These changes allow architects and developers to manage the various changes 
produced in the customer's needs and to automate the maintenance and evolution of existing systems via the 
mapping rules between the two functional and non-functional aspects. 
First, we generated the SDSIB from SDSEB after applying the new LOC in order to correctly 
determine all the interactions and system components involved in the execution of the system processes. In 
this model, we assign the responsibilities and security semantics to system’s objects. 
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This model is considered a Platform-independent Model (PIM) generated from the Computing 
Independent Model (CIM) model by applying a set of model-to-model transformations; CIM focuses on the 
system environment. Then we produce the PSM by adding the most important information related to the 
chosen platform (platform models) to PIM. The PSM already improved with the security policies semantics. 
Therefore, we must improve it with the constraints of security policies depending on the chosen platform. To 
do this, we have allowed PSM extensibility by deducting an intermediate model from PSM; the intermediate 
model is ready to receive other improvements related to a non-functional aspect. 
In addition, we have stereotyped this model with our UML profile (security profile) to grow it with 
the constraints of security policies. The UML profile for security is an extension of UML dedicated to 
improving the software’s functionalities with security features related to authentication, authorization, data 
integrity, and data encryption; The UML profile is based on stereotypes and values marked to adopt UML for 
a particular performance. 
Practically, we have proposed a specific code generator for the UP-XP approach to generate the 
source code corresponding to both functional and non-functional aspects. This code generator takes as input 
an already annotated intermediate model with security policy performances and converts it into source code. 
It uses their templates to generate the final code by weaving the security policies on the software’s 
functionalities through these templates; a template described by helpers.In Figure 3, a diagram describing the 
owerview of the approach. We also illustrate the most important stations for the production of secure and 
scalable applications. 
In Figure 4, we present a current example describing how to automatically generate the complete 
code for system’s entites, attributes, operations, persistent entities, and security configuration. The source 
code deduced from the design model obtained from SDSIB by applying a set of model transformations. In 
this conversion, we enriched the domain class diagram with the necessary operations derived from SDSIB 
already enhanced with the semantics of security policy constraints. Then, we applied the security profile 
defined by UML profile to increase the security of secure semantics. After having been stereotyped the 
intermediate model, the code generator intervenes to weave their templates into the system's functionalities. 
As you can see, we annotated Email, Login, and Password respectively with EmailValidation, unique and 






Figure 2. Diagram describing the owerview of the approach 
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Figure 3. Running example of code generation from profiled model 
 
 
5. SEQUENCE DIAGRAM OF SYSTEM’S INTERNAL BEHAVOIR 
Sequence Diagram of System’s Internal Behavior (SDSIB) is a sequence diagram got from the 
Sequence Diagram of System’s External Behavior (SDSEB) after its enlargement with the new semantic of 
LOC and grasp patterns. Our overall strategic objective is to indicate responsibilities to system entities 
through the new extension of design pattern high cohesion, security controller, expert, creator, and low 
coupling. We have updated these responsibilities to take into account the security context suggested by the 
chosen platform described via the UML profile for security. This technique will promote the integration of 
security policy constraints at the intermediate model level. In addition, we have reinforced this commitment 
to describe the state of the system before and after executing system actions in a secure manner. In this 
SDSIB, we cite precisely all the components of the system, and the interactions negotiated to perform a 
requested action; SDSIB focused on the temporal aspect of the message transaction between system objects. 
To provide an approach that considers non-functional aspects during the software development 
process to produce scalable and secure software, we provide potential enhancements to the SDSEB to inject 
the semantics and structure of the non-functional aspects during their elaboration. The new SDSIB 
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representation allows domain’s experts to draw secure communications between system’s objects according 
to security responsibilities granted to each component participated in the interaction. The new semantic of 
LOC and design patterns allow us to take into account authentication rules, authorization rules, integrity 
rules, availability rules, and data encryption rules at the assignment of responsibilities to contributed objects. 
Then, we improve them with the requested stereotypes to consider the performance of the UML profile; this 
is done after the integration of the platform models.  
 
5.1.  Proposed Metamodel for SDSIB 
We chose the SDSIB as PIM, so we defined the PIM meta-model by adopting security performances 
and sustainability during the whole software lifecycle. As shown in Figure 4, we have reached the SDSEB to 
point out the operations and resources of the system planned to achieve the final goal which is the security 
policies integration, and automatic generation of code from secure models. We applied the new semantics of 
LOC and grasp patterns on the SDSEB to extend it to SDSIB and integrate the low coupling and, high 
cohesion performances. 
For use cases of the system, we draw a SDSIB to define the state of the system before and after the 
treatment by following the proposed meta-model that describes the structure of the interactions. We thus 
enrich SDSIB with the necessary meta-classes of security meta-models such as ModelElement, Permission, 
Role, ModelElement, ActionType, ImplementationEnvironment, ActionContext, Precondition, 
PostCondition, IntegrityConstraints, AthentificationConstraint, AthourizationConstraint, 
DataEncryptionConstraint, and AvailabilityConstraint. 
We cite components, business controllers, security controller, DAO, and view layer for each use 
case. By applying a set of model transformations, we incorporate the security policies meta-classes 
designated in the security meta-model to SDSIB. Accordingly, we strengthened introducing of security 
policies semantics during SDSIB discussion in order to improve its extension at the intermediate model level 





Figure 4. Proposed metamodel for Sequence diagram of system’s internal behavior 
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5.2.  Transformation Process 
5.2.1 Model to Model 
Once the modeling phase built, we set up the transformation rules in the goal to connect each 
element of the source model with its equivalent in the target model according to the conditions and rules for 
converting all necessary changes. It is deployed to make a subsequent refinement called exogenous 
transformation.  We can use it to make the correspondence between all elements of the security policies 
model of the input model and the element of the SDSIB output model.   It does the correspondence among all 
components of the SDSIB input model and the components of the domain class diagram output model to 
improve it with the system’s internal behavior. For each interaction, we define the semantics of security 
policies, precondition, postcondition, and solicited components. Then, we connect these interactions to 
intermediate model to extend it with necessary improvements provided via the UML profile for security; we 
specified Atlas Language Transformation (ATL) [19] as tool. 
 
5.2.2 Model to Text 
The first conversion produces the XMI/XML file for the design model respecting the new semantic 
of LOC and design patterns. The second step consists in generating a final code of the software from the 
profiled model.  To do this, there are numerous mechanisms for code generation; deploying scripting 
languages, XML pressing, WebML, WebDSL, Stratego/XT or Acceleo. However, these tools have not 
focused on generating source code for no-functional aspects and do not use an intermediate model for 
enabling the PSM extensibility before code generation. Additionally, we proposed our own code generator 
based on the model transformation language. 
 
5.2.3 Code Generation 
For automatic code generation for both aspects functional and no-functional, we proposed our own 
code generator that is implementation of the Object Management Group (OMG) MOF Model to Text 
Language (MTL) standard. In this tool, we considered the following criteria:  
1. Do not use concrete syntax. 
2. Uses intermediate model. 
3. Supports the entire development process. 
4. Supports Object-Oriented systems. 
5. Generates system’soperations and their bodies. 
6. Generates security infrastructure configuration. 
7. Generates security controllers. 
8. Generates controllers. 
The operating principle is to expand generated templates to produce the last code from output model 
profiled with the UML profile (intermediate model). We preferred Java as a platform to approve our 
approach. So we established specific templates for the security policies in term of authentication, 
authorization, data integrity, data encryption, and availability through the helpers written in ATL. Then, we 
improved the business logic code with other layers of security policies given respecting the code generator 
templates; the code generator templates automatically transform the profiled models obtained in the previous 
transformations into source code according to the chosen platform. 
 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As result, we have suggested a new methodology to lead the whole development process based on 
the separation of concerns. We have strengthened the MDA theory to incorporate the security application and 
software durability throughout the software development cycle by determining the correct time of 
improvement. For this, we have extended the MDA structure to combine absorptions and safety 
performanceas an independent abstraction. We offered a new semantic for LOC and design patterns as a 
methodological support for producing software’s behavior.In this semantics, we have improved the 
effectiveness of low coupling and high cohesion of design patterns to promote software scalability.We 
established a set of syntaxes for security policies written in OCL to validate the relevance of systems 
models.we applied this LOC on the SDSEB to obtain an SDSIB improved with security rules and scalability 
of the software, security policies granted to the responsibilities of the object. 
From a statistical point of view, our methodology increases the degree of automation, the level of 
genericity and reuse, and the number of lines of code generated in comparison with other approaches given in 
these topics. We addressed five properties: confidentiality, authorization, availability, data integrity, and data 
encryption while there are many important approaches addressing just access control. In addition, we 
proposed the UML profile for security as a specific tool to improve the intermediate model with security 
policies constraints according to security needs, and automate the implementation phase. This approach has 
been enhanced with a formalism facilitating the integration of security policies. 
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From a practical point of view, we produced our own specific code generator based on the model 
transformation language to generate the corresponding code form profiled models. The value added by this 
proposal is that we use an intermediate model to enable PSM extensibility before generating the source code. 
Therefore, this advantage does not appear in previous code generators as WebML, WebDSL, Stratego/XT or 
Acceleo. Existing code generators and methodologies do not generate security configurations and do not 
support the entire development process. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we proposed a new model-driven approach for generating secure software. This 
methodology based on the OMG standard, the new meta-model for SDSIB, UML profile, and new semantic 
of LOC and design patterns. To establish this approach, we first study and extended the SDSEB to SDSIB to 
implement the semantics of security policies by applying the new semantic of LOC which is an 
implementation of LOC and OCL; the generated model represents our input model (PIM) which also 
describes security policies and interactions. We have defined a meta-model for the SDSIB taking into 
account the constraints of security policies when assigning responsibilities. Secondly, we inject the platform 
models to obtainded PIM to set up a specific PSM; we chose as an implementation the java platform. third, 
for reasons of extensibility we retrieved an intermediate model from (PSM) to allow its extensibility. In this 
work, we profiled our intermediate model with the UML profile for security to improve the semantics of 
security policies with the security rules communicated through a set of stereotypes. After that, the code 
generator was developed for both model-model (refinement) and intermediate model to text (source code). 
As result, we were able to generate secure applications that respect the new LOC semantic and design 
patterns. We were able to combine between both aspects fuctional and no-functional throughout the software 
development process. 
As future studies, we intend to generalize this methodology on.NET, CORBA, and PHP platforms 
and address other properties of non-functional aspects such as persistence, synchronization, and the 
component-oriented systems. Also, we aim to enhance our generator to cover the view layer by generating 
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